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The adoption of the Bill of Rights' in 1791 was the people's
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New York.
I gratefully acknowledge the editorial and substantive criticism of my wife, Susan
Leshe Wishingrad, Esq. For without her encouragement and support, this essay, and the
ones leading up to it, would never have been finished amidst the pressures of a law
practice.
1. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
Amendment II
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Amendment III
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
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price for ratifying the Constitution in 1789.2 Since 1791, the first
ten amendments have been the subject of countless cases. And
in virtually all these cases, the specific clause of the particular
amendment in dispute has been judicially dissected and sepa-
rately interpreted. Unfortunately, these clause-specific glosses
distance us from the Bill of Rights as a whole - an elegant,
unitary text, which contains only 461 words.
Scores of books have been written on individual amend-
ments.' Many others have scrutinized a single clause within an
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Amendment VII
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of a trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people.
2. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (1958); W. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS
13 (1961).
3. E.g., W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1976); THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY (J. Bartlett ed. 1979); D. HARDY, ORI-
GINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1986); C. MOYLAN, THE RIGHT OF
THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1977); N. LAS-
SON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (1937); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (2nd ed. 1987); L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968); L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMEND-
MENT (1959); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1951); C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND
THE JURY (1962) (seventh amendment); B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMEND-
MENT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL CON-
DITIONS OF TODAY (1955); THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEAN-
ING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (R. Barnett ed. 1989); P. Hay & R. Rotunda, The United
States Federal System: Legal Integration In The American Experience (1982) (tenth
amendment).
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amendment." But there are only a precious few books on the en-
tire Bill of Rights, and most of these have a historical or narra-
tive thrust.' There is little analysis of the interrelations between
and among the first ten amendments. Nor is there a comprehen-
sive interpretation of the Bill of Rights as a whole.
James Madison, our fourth President, and Thomas Jeffer-
son, our third President, were products of the Enlightenment.
Madison was a principal author of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. Jefferson was a philosophical force behind the Bill of
Rights and Virginia's seminal Declaration of Rights.'
Madison and Jefferson brought to the Bill of Rights their
knowledge of political texts and of Enlightenment philosophy.
They also brought to the Bill of Rights their generalist legal
training and classical and literary education.7 Most important,
they both were infused with first-hand knowledge that unbridled
governmental power inexorably leads to its arbitrary abuse.
Time goes by. Almost 200 years have passed. Law practice is
now dominated by narrowly trained specialists. There is the tax
lawyer, the corporate lawyer, the bankruptcy lawyer, and the
real estate lawyer. The civil rights bar is also fragmented. There
is the first amendment libel lawyer and the eighth amendment
death penalty lawyer, to name just two.
4. E.g., THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING
OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS (B. Chamberlin & C. Brown eds. 1982); Z. CHAFFEE,
JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE Ex-
PRESSION (1970); L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1986); M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL
(1977) (presentment clause); M. BERGET, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1980); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969); S. SEARLES, REAL ESTATE VALUATION
AND CONDEMNATION (1979) (just compensation); W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS (1955).
5. E.g., R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1955); W. DOUGLAS, A LIV-
ING BILL OF RIGHTS (1961); W. BRENNAN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES (1961); H.
KNIGHT, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE MEANING OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TODAY
(1967); I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING (1965); M. FRIBOURG, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1967).
6. The Virginia Declaration of Rights was drafted by George Mason and contains 16
specific guarantees similar to the Bill of Rights. A convention of Virginia delegates
adopted the Declaration nearly one month prior to the Declaration of Independence. 8
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION XXiV (J. Kamin-
sky & G. Saladino ed. 1988).
7. See R. FERGUSON, LAW & LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
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Academia is similarly balkanized. The Bill of Rights is stud-
ied piecemeal in law school.' The fourth amendment,9 and its
rules on "searches and seizures," and parts of the fifth amend-
ment,10 such as the grand jury requirement, the double jeopardy
clause, and the privilege against self-incrimination, are typically
covered in criminal procedure courses. The sixth amendment 1 is
a minibill of rights for the criminally accused. It guarantees the
accused, among other rights, the "right to a speedy and public
trial," an "impartial jury," and "Assistance of Counsel." Some of
these rights are explored in criminal procedure classes, others in
seminars.
The fifth amendment's "just compensation" clause is usu-
ally treated in constitutional law, or in an advanced real estate
class. The seventh amendment, 2 which guarantees a right to a
jury in civil cases, is naturally covered in civil procedure classes.
The tenth amendment,' 3 which reserves for the States, or the
people, "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States," is separately
covered in an advanced course on federal jurisdiction.
Other amendments, if studied at all, are taught occasionally
in small seminars. There are, for example, seminars on the
eighth amendment's 4 "cruel and unusual punishments" clause
and the death penalty. And there are, of course, a myriad of
seminars on the first amendment's 8 freedom of speech and the
press clauses, as well as others on its "free exercise" and anti-
establishment of religion clauses. The first amendment is also
treated in constitutional law classes.
Still other amendments are rarely, if ever, mentioned, let
alone studied. Two such amendments are the second amend-
ment,'6 which links the "right of the people to keep and bear
8. See Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 295 (1980).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. II. See Levinson, The Embarassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L. J. 637 (1989).
[Vol. 10:609
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss3/2
BILL OF RIGHTS
Arms" to the need for a "well regulated Militia," and the third
amendment,' which bars the quartering of soldiers "in any
house" except during "time of war, . . . in a manner to be pre-
scribed by law."
The ninth amendment" states: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." It is a "water blot,"
according to former federal Judge Robert Bork, an unsuccessful
Supreme Court nominee. To most others, it is an indecipherable
Rosetta stone - a terribly important, but unfathomable, text.
As such, it is discussed - and not always seriously - only in
connection with the landmark right of privacy case of Griswold
v. Connecticut.'9 In Griswold, Justice Douglas found a "right of
privacy" from "penumbras, formed by emanations" from the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments."0
Lawyers of the left and of the right - and from the vast
middle for that matter - are thus trained in law school, and
then in practice, to analyze the Bill of Rights, clause by separate
clause, and amendment by particular amendment. Conse-
quently, lawyers and jurists fail to understand the symbiotic re-
lations among the ten amendments of the Bill of Rights.
Yet no one would interpret the first chapter of a ten chapter
novel without considering it, and the other nine chapters, in
light of the entire work. Nor would a lawyer interpret a clause in
a contract without considering how that clause related to the
contract as a whole.2 For "[a] cardinal principle governing the
17. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED
STATES SENATE: NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, EEC. REPT. No. 100-7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11
(1987).
[The judge] must treat [the provision] as nonexistent, since, in terms of expres-
sion of the framers' will, it is nonexistent . . . . When the meaning of a provision
1. . is unknown, the judge has in effect nothing more than a water blot on the
document before him. He cannot read it; any meaning he assigns to it is no more
than judicial invention of a constitutional prohibition; and his proper course is to
ignore it.
Id. (citing "Interpretation of the Constitution," 1984 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture,
University of So. California, October 25, 1984, at 11-12).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
20. Id. at 484. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.13 (2d ed. 1988).
21. See, e.g., E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.10 (1st ed. 1982).
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construction of contracts is that the entire contract must be con-
sidered ..... ,2 And as the Supreme Court has similarly put it
about a statute: "In expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." 3
Each of the first ten amendments should similarly be read and
understood with reference to each other and the Bill of Rights
and the Constitution as a whole.2
But the fragmentation of legal studies and legal practice has
obscured the interrelations between and among the first ten
amendments. Consequently, we are losing sight of the Bill of
Rights as a whole.
We may also be forgetting the collective meaning and over-
arching mission of the Bill of Rights: to guarantee the people
certain rights and to prohibit the government from taking cer-
tain actions, and to prescribe the requisites before certain other
governmental actions may be taken. So it needs to be empha-
sized that the Bill of Rights was intended to be a barrier - not
a rickety picket fence - protecting the people from their
government.
When was the last time, if ever, that any of us leaned back
in a comfortable chair and read - without interruption - the
Bill of Rights, from the first amendment straight through to the
tenth? Having recently done so, I offer some thoughts and ques-
tions on the interrelations among the amendments of the Bill of
Rights in anticipation of the 1991 bicentennial.
The first amendment guarantees the "free exercise," and
anti-establishment, of religion, "freedom of speech, or of the
press," and the "right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for redress of grievances." Can we
then, looking at all these clauses together, analogize or fairly in-
fer, from the "coordinated purposes"2 of these particulars a
more general right of conscience? Perhaps so.
Thus it seems that the understanding of the interrelations
22. Rentways v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 N.Y. 342, 347, 126 N.E.2d 271, 273
(1955).
23. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (quoting United States v. Heirs
of Boisdorr6, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850)) (emphasis added).
24. See Wishingrad, Unitary Arguments, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
25. See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
[Vol. 10:609
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begins within the text of the first amendment itself. Its clauses
on speech and press, religion, and association have related, if not
common, concerns. They must, therefore, be read and inter-
preted with reference to each other.
The second amendment provides that "[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep [in their houses] and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed." The third amendment provides that "[n]o soldier
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." Both the second and the third amendments
deal with military matters. And the second, impliedly, and the
third explicitly, place the "house" off limits to intrusions by the
government, except in certain narrowly delineated
circumstances.
Is there, then, also a relationship between the third amend-
ment's limitation on government intrusion into "any house" and
the fourth amendment's "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures"? Is the sanctity of, and privacy interest
in, a person's "house" underscored by its specific protection
under both the third and fourth and, impliedly, under the sec-
ond, amendments? I think it is.
What are the full dimensions of the "intimate relation-
ship ' 26 that Justice Bradley found between the fourth and fifth
amendments in Boyd v. United States? 2 Does this "intimate re-
lationship" add anything to either? To both? Or, put the other
way, what is the consequence of severing or ending that relation-
ship? Probably less protection being afforded by each
amendment.28
Similarly, what is the relationship between the first and the
fourth amendments, which share a rich legal and political his-
tory? Is it merely a coincidence that several landmark fourth
amendment cases involved the attempted seizure of writings, or
26. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28. See Abel, 362 U.S. at 255-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare Boyd, 116 U.S.
616 (a court-ordered production of private invoices violated the fourth and fifth amend-
ments) with Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compulsory production of
incriminating tax documents not violative of the fifth amendment).
1990]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
of other materials arguably protected by the first amendment,
rather than ordinary contraband? I think not.29 Are these cases
first or fourth amendment cases? Or are they really first and
fourth amendment cases? Does it matter?30 I think So.31
How, on occasion, can the due process clause of the fifth, or
fourteenth amendments, along with the excessive fines clause of
the eighth amendment, collectively limit the amount of punitive
damages that may be awarded? 3 Are the first amendment's
speech and press clauses, when taken together with either the
excessive fines clause and the due process clause, or both, still
another source of limits on gargantuan punitive damage awards
slapped on media defendants in libel cases?3"
Can we analogize, or infer, from the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishments clause and its excessive bail and
excessive fines clauses, a more general prohibition of excessive
punishments? The Court has done so."' And, if so, does the
eighth amendment's "proportionality" principle apply more
strictly, when arguably first amendment conduct is the subject
of Draconian criminal sanctions, which may chill the exercise of
first amendment rights?35 As Chief Judge James L. Oakes, of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, put it in
29. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989) (adult books
and films); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (a newspaper's photographs
and negatives); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973) (obscene film); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (lewd and lascivious books and pictures); Entick v. Carrington, 19
HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765) (private papers, including books and pamphlets).
30. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (majority limited its inquiry to the
first amendment in upholding the Georgia sodomy statute while the dissent argued that
the first and the fourth amendment prohibited the conviction of homosexuals practicing
sodomy in the privacy of their home).
31. Wishingrad, Privacy and the Bill of Rights, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
32. But see Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989) (exces-
sive fines clause of the eighth amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards in
private civil cases).
33. See Wishingrad, Eighth Amendment 'Due Process,' N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1989, at 2,
col. 3.
34. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life
imprisonment sentence without the possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist
statute for issuing no account check for $100 violated the eighth amendment).
35. See Schwartz & Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the En-
lightenment: An Historical Justification of the Weems v. United States Excessive Pun-
ishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. Rav. 783, 798 n.65 (1975).
[Vol. 10:609
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his 1979 James Madison lecture: "Time and again it was in pro-
tecting freedom of thought, of conscience, or of expression that
the procedural rights embodied in our fourth through eighth
amendments were first asserted, then given substance, and fi-
nally enshrined as basic to our institutions. 3
Finally, the methodological role of the ninth amendment in
justifying the development of the Bill of Rights by what I call
"Constitutional Analogies," needs to be explored in depth. Con-
stitutional Analogies is a method of legal reasoning that involves
a textually, structurally, and historically based interpretation of
the interrelations of two or more amendments of the Bill of
Rights. This method of reasoning by analogies from two or more
amendments, or other clauses in the Constitution, takes into ac-
count the texts of those amendments or clauses, and their re-
spective histories, underlying philosophies, and the values or
rights those texts protect or reflect. It is a reading sympathetic
to the Framers' more general goals and concerns.3
Constitutional Analogies should, therefore, be developed
whenever a governmental threat to life, liberty, or property is
not specifically bridled by a particular amendment, but offends
or abridges several, at least in substantial part. In short, it is a
way to read - or "expound"as Chief Justice Marshall put it in
McCulloch v. Maryland8 - the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights as a whole.
Put still another way, Constitutional Analogies provide a
way to think about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as a
whole and how they can be construed to retain vitality. They
also provide a way to think about the texts and their histories,
collectively, not in series, while being sensitive to common
ground.3 9
As the Supreme Court has stated: "Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
36. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights,
54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 921-22 (1979).
37. Wishingrad, Why Law and Literature?, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); Wishingrad, Book Review, 70 A.B.A. J. 152
(Oct. 1984) (reviewing J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984)).
39. Cf. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 97, 102 (1987) (The ninth amendment should be viewed "as a
rule of construction guiding the process of constitutional interpretation.").
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principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of con-
stitutions."" 'Constitutional Analogies is the method to insure
the continuing vitality of the principles - not just the particu-
lars - embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
One avenue to explore Constitutional Analogies is to ana-
lyze Supreme Court decisions that do not rest comfortably on
the text of a single amendment. These include, in addition to
the controversial "right of privacy"4 cases and the "right to
travel"42 cases, others such as Boyd v. United States,4 3 Tennes-
see v. Garner,44 Stanley v. Georgia,45 and United States v.
United States District Court.4
Looking at the Bill of Rights as a whole, it is interesting to
note that no less than four of the ten amendments - the
fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth - provide highly specific protec-
tions for "criminals." This reflects the Framers' intention to
limit and narrowly channel the government's most potent
weapon - the criminal law. For the Framers knew too well that
the criminal law could be misused to sweep up political dissent-
ers and punish them arbitrarily and severely, as common
criminals, for minor infractions (e.g., illegal picketing) which
could chill the exercise of first amendment freedoms.
The criminal law may be utilized in other ways that raise a
myriad of serious constitutional issues. The Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, "RICO,"47 is a unique ex-
emplar. And traditional modes of legal analysis pale in the face
of its hydra-headed structure.
RICO has withstood a barrage of legal attacks.48 Most of the
40. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2919 (1989) (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
41. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942).
42. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
43. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth and fifth amendments).
44. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (fourth and eighth amendments).
45. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first and fourteenth amendments); 394 U.S. at 569-72
(Stewart, J., concurring) (fourth and fourteenth amendments).
46. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (first and fourth amendments).
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
48. See Comment, The RICO Pattern After Sedima - A Case for Multifactored
Analysis, 19 SETON HALL 73, 79-95 (1989).
[Vol. 10:609
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attacks have focused on one of the various parts of RICO's awe-
some arsenal. And most have involved issues of statutory inter-
pretation. But the real issue is whether RICO as a whole violates
the Bill of Rights as a whole.
Several years ago, in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,49 the
United States Supreme Court refused to limit RICO to plaintiffs
who could allege a specific "racketeering injury." 0 Nor did the
Court limit RICO to defendants who had previously been con-
victed of a racketeering act, or a prior RICO violation. 51 Yet the
Court acknowledged concern that civil RICO might be used
against "legitimate" businesses, as well as mobsters and organ-
ized criminals.2
This and other interpretative battles have essentially been
lost in the courts. The judicial view is that we elect a Congress
and it gives us the laws we deserve - no matter how badly con-
ceived, ill defined, and over zealously implemented. These inter-
pretative battles must now be taken up in Congress. But legisla-
tive relief is not imminent.
Further recourse to the courts is, however, appropriate for
constitutional challenges. The next round of legal attacks should
not be aimed at separate pieces of RICO , but instead at the
belly of the beast. These constitutional arguments should not be
based solely on an isolated amendment of the Bill of Rights.
Rather a "unitary" argument, as Justice Thurgood Marshall put
it in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Salerno,53 should
be based on constitutional analogies from the Bill of Rights as a
whole.
Last term the Supreme Court upheld the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984"4 in two criminal cases.55 This forfeiture
law applies to criminal RICO defendants and others accused
49. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
50. Id. at 495. See Abrams, The Place for Procedural Control in Determining Who
May Sue and Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation From Civil RICO and
Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1477 (1985).
51. 473 U.S. at 495.
52. Id. at 499-500.
53. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2107 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. §
853 (1988).
55. Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United
States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
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of certain drug related crimes." It permits the govern-
ment - btfore trial - to seize assets if a court finds probable
cause to believe the assets come from the defendant's alleged
criminal acts.5 7
The Court saved the forfeiture statute from attack as a vio-
lation of the sixth amendment. Not too convincingly, the Court
reasoned that "[w]hatever the full extent of the Sixth Amend-
ment's protection of one's right to retain counsel," it does not
encompass the right to use the government's money." So much
for the presumption of innocence.
The Court also separately rejected a second constitutional
challenge based on the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.59 The imaginative argument, which needs to be bolstered
by more than just the due process clause, was that the forfeiture
statute permits the government to upset the "balance of forces
between the accused and the accuser." 0 The Court was not
moved.
The Bill of Rights appears to be losing a war of attrition. It,
not the "mob," is in danger of being dismembered by RICO,
amendment by amendment and clause by separate clause.
In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,"' RICO suffered its
first major setback in the Supreme Court. This success in limit-
ing RICO, albeit a state law analog, is instructive for future con-
stitutional challenges.
The Court held that a pretrial seizure of a bookstore
owner's books and films based on a finding of probable cause,
before there had been any judicial determination that the seized
items were "obscene," violated the first amendment.2 The Court
also acknowledged that first amendment concerns limit
"searches and seizures" under the fourth amendment.6 3
A similar joint, or unitary, argument based on Constitu-
tional Analogies from two or more amendments in the Bill of
56. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
57. Id. § 853(e)(1).
58. Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered, 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
59. Id. at 2656.
60. Id.
61. 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
62. Id. at 927, 929.
63. Id. at 927-28.
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Rights, needs to be marshalled to confront RICO as a whole.
The devastating impact of the totality of RICO - on the
"guilty" and "innocent" alike - comes from the procedural ad-
vantages it affords prosecutors, its substantive breadth and in-
herent vagueness, and its Draconian penalties.
For a start, the talented defense lawyers' closing arguments
to the jury in last fall's Princeton/Newport racketeering trial
sagely included a claim that forfeitures of over $20 million
sought by the government after conviction would constitute
"cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the eighth
amendment."" Southern District Judge Robert L. Carter's deci-
sion cited the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" clause when he threw out the Princeton/Newport jury's
$3.8 million forfeiture verdict.6 5 Justice Scalia, dissenting in the
Court's most recent RICO decision, H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,66 handed down at the end of June 1989,
stated: "That the highest Court in the land has been unable to
derive from [RICO] anything more than . . . meager guidance
bodes ill for the day when [a constitutional] challenge is
presented." 67
The key then is to show how RICO's features work together
to stack the legal deck against the accused, and to understand
how RICO collectively raises serious constitutional questions
under at least five of the ten amendments of the Bill of Rights.
So here is an outline of the "unitary" Constitutional argument
against RICO for violating the Bill of Rights as a whole.
RICO permits seizure of assets before trial. 8 This impli-
cates the fourth amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable
searches and seizures." RICO also permits seizure of legal fees in
the hands of attorneys of RICO defendants.6 This implicates
the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right of counsel. RICO
64. United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447, 456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
65. Id. at 457.
66. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
67. Id. at 2909 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also J. Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality
of RICO, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988).
69. Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United
States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
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is also hopelessly vague and indeterminate. 70 This defect, along
with the interference with counsel, implicates the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, which requires fair notice of what
is criminal and fair procedures. RICO also imposes Draconian
penalties, including treble damage awards.7 This implicates the
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" in egregious cases. Finally, RICO is too often used
against alleged "pornographers," who in many instances sell
books of literary value as well. 72 This implicates the first amend-
ment, which guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.
Taken together, RICO presents a "clear and present dan-
ger" to several - not just one - of our cherished rights and
liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights. RICO is an amalgam of
procedural and substantive provisions. So it needs to be mea-
sured against the Bill of Rights as a whole, which is a collection
of procedural protections and substantive rights for individuals,
and prohibitions of certain governmental actions. If square vio-
lations of various specific amendments raise close and compel-
ling questions, then the question of whether RICO as a whole
violates the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights as a whole, is
one that the Court should ultimately address.
In this period between the 1987 bicentennial of the Consti-
tution and the approaching 1991 bicentennial of the Bill of
Rights, we would do well to remember that many constitutional
questions do not fall squarely under one clause in a particular
amendment, or even under just one amendment. Indeed, it is too
common for a threat to liberty, such as an invasion of the "right
to privacy," to infringe on values inherent or implicit in the text,
history, and political philosophy of several amendments - not
just one.
The failure to understand, articulate, and debate about the
interrelations between and among the amendments that com-
prise the Bill of Rights has created a clear and present danger to
the "right to privacy," which now hangs precariously from the
tattered texts of several amendments. As Justice Harry D.
Blackmun recently wrote in his impassioned dissent in the Web-
70. See H.J., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2908 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988).
72. See Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
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ster v. Reproductive Health Serv., Inc.,73 abortion case:
The plurality does not even mention, much less join, the true ju-
risprudential debate underlying the case: whether the Constitu-
tion includes an 'unenumerated' general right to privacy as recog-
nized in many of our decisions, most notably Griswold v.
Connecticut, and Roe [v. Wade], and, more specifically, whether
and to what extent such a right to privacy extends to matters of
childbearing and family life, including abortion.7 4
But in Roe v. Wade,75 Justice Blackmun, then writing for
the Court, did not initiate the "true jurisprudential debate." In-
stead, he wrote:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 76
Such an ambiguous explanation is not sufficient to ground a
fundamental right. So before the celebration of the bicentennial
of the Bill of Rights begins with fireworks and similar festivities,
the Bill of Rights should be read straight through - from the
first amendment to the tenth. Then, here and elsewhere, there
should be a robust, no-holds-barred debate about its fabled his-
tory, its collective meaning today, and, most important, its
meaning for tomorrow.
, For such a public discussion of the Bill of Rights as a whole
is surely the most meaningful way to commemorate its passage
almost 200 years ago. It is also the only way to insure that those
rights will survive the Sturm und Drang of political battles and
technological progress for at least another 200 years.
73. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
74. Id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. Id. at 153.
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